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BREAKING JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
DEADLOCKS: BEFORE THE TEXAS SHOOT-OUT,
TRY A TEXAS SHOUT-OUT
NORMAN NADORFF* & QUINNCY MCNEAL**

I. The Scene
“TEXAS SHOOT-OUT!” The very name evokes an image of two fidgety
gunslingers faced off on a hot and dusty Laredo Wild West street. Each
struggles with second thoughts about having accepted a fateful challenge
they might not live to regret.
* Special Counsel, Mayer Brown.
** Associate, Mayer Brown.
The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Holly Kingingham while a
summer intern at Mayer Brown, in particular in compiling Annexes 2 and 3. We also wish to
thank Norman´s sister, Nina Rose, for supplying the dueling cowboys sketch.
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Fast forward to the modern world of 50/50 joint ventures where the “Texas
Shoot-out” clause (“TSO”) is a popular, but often dreaded, voting deadlockbreaking method (“DBM”). We will describe below the TSO in its classic
form and context and outline a few other options. More importantly, we will
suggest how to make a draconian TSO both more palatable to wary clients
and less prone to undesired and irreversible consequences. Indeed, we
believe that placing a well-drafted Texas Shout-out within a well-considered
joint venture agreement (“JVA”) may well provide an ounce of prevention
worth a pound of cure.
This article focuses upon the 50/50 business joint venture (“JV”) where
deadlocks are particularly challenging to break.
II. The Landscape
JVs resemble marriages in a number of ways:
$

There are no guarantees of success;

$

Their duration depends a lot on circumstances and parties´
attitudes going in;

$

Frictions inevitably occur over time that hopefully can be resolved
amicably;

$

Money does not solve all problems – but it sure helps!

$

“Shotguns” sometimes play a role; and

$

Chances of success (or at least an equitable parting) can be
enhanced through a well-considered pre-nuptial (i.e., JVA).

For present purposes, let us focus upon the last bullet—the JVA—and in
particular, upon its DBM provisions. As with marriages, joint ventures may
thrive for years, to each party’s benefit, only to grind to a halt upon
unforeseen circumstances, detrimental events, or simply, a change of heart.
The result can be any combination of stagnation, decreased revenues, lost
profits, credit woes, employee discontent and, ultimately, insolvency. The
effective JVA drafter foresees such impasses and forges a fit-for-purpose
DBM to avoid calamity and allow for a seamless transition to a new phase of
the JV, hopefully to the benefit of both parties.
As always, there is more than one way to skin a cat. This article will
describe the available alternatives but focus on the TSO for the reasons cited
in Section IV.
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III. Alternate Approaches1
Shoot-out provisions are like trips to the dentist. No one likes them, but
they are a necessary evil if you are involved in, or advising, a 50/50 JV.
Designed to end deadlocks, they reflect the reality that even the best
intentioned and deftly structured JVs may eventually reach an intractable
voting impasse on a fundamental issue. Like marriages that begin with toasts,
speeches, and big smiles, experience shows that some marriages and most
joint ventures will eventually run their course, often due to a crucial
deadlock. A variety of deadlock provisions exists to address a variety of
deadlock causes.
We describe below the most common types of such provisions. Typically,
their application portends a radical transformation, if not the end of, the JV
per se. Some of the provisions are less drastic than others, even permitting
intervention by a neutral third party. Nevertheless, these provisions are often
drastic when applied, as they do not allow adequate opportunity for dueling
parties to defuse.
1. Russian Roulette. Under this option, Party A sets the terms and price of
Party B’s 50% participating interest (“PI”), whereupon Party B decides
whether to sell or buy on those terms (essentially, “I cut, you choose”). For
example, fed up with Larry, Rebecca notifies him that she is willing to either
purchase his interest or sell her interest at an indicated price. Larry then has
a defined period to decide and counterpropose. A JVA employing this DBM
should provide ample time for Party B (Larry) to consider his options. In
theory, this approach forces Party A (Rebecca) to propose a reasonable PI
value, since she will be on the hook to sell or buy at the trigger price,
depending on Larry’s election.2
2. Mexican Shoot-out. In this case each Party submits to the other a sealed
bid indicating the minimum price for which it would be prepared to sell its
50% share. Whichever sealed bid is higher “wins,” and that bidder then buys
the “loser’s” share at the price indicated in the loser’s sealed bid. This
approach, also known as the “Dutch Auction,” differs from the TSO in that
the focus is on the selling price rather than the buying price.
3. Appraisal Method. Under this method, a qualified expert provides an
independent appraisal of the value of the PI in question (“Appraised Value”).
1. See the checklist at Annex 2 for a handy side-by-side comparison of various
contractual and non-contractual DBM approaches.
2. Carsten Beith et al., Challenging Transactions: Confronting Difficult Regulatory,
Tax, Antitrust, and Business Issues in Hospital to Hospital Transactions and HospitalPhysician Arrangements, 20160627 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 31.
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Used in conjunction with a buy-out provision, the appraisal method
determines valuation through the parties’ choice of: (1) an agreed single
appraiser, (2) an average of two appraisals (one appraiser chosen by each
party), (3) an average of the two closest appraisals among a wider set of
appraisals, (4) a premium on, or discount from, the Appraised Value, based
on the reason for the dissolution (or some other factor, such as breach of the
JVA), or (5) an appraiser’s choice between each party’s valuation of the PI.3
Typically, the JVA will define the specific appraisal to be used in case of a
qualifying voting deadlock.
Of course, hybrids are always a possibility. For example, Larry and
Rebecca might agree upon the following variation: Upon deadlock, Rebecca
and Larry each select an appraiser. If the resulting appraisals fall within a
defined percentage or price threshold of each other and are comparable, the
Appraised Value will be the average of the two. Failing which, the two partyselected appraisers choose a third appraiser to make the final appraisal
(within the range of the first two).
The appraisal approach is less drastic than its “Russian” and “Mexican”
counterparts, but it also requires more time and cost and deprives the
combatants of their ability, in effect, to control their own fate.4
4. Outside Tiebreaker. The parties may also refer to a designated
tiebreaker as a DBM. When this provision is invoked, the parties call upon a
specified, pre-designated third party to break the deadlock. A variation of this
method requires the tiebreaker to decide how the deadlock is resolved by
making certain, specific determinations, which the parties decide beforehand
will resolve the dispute. Tiebreakers benefit from being generally easy to
draft and generally allow the JV to continue. Indeed, a well-drafted tiebreaker
may remain available to resolve subsequent disputes. The JV partners may
find it difficult to agree upon a third-party tiebreaker due to concerns about
impartiality. Candidates unfamiliar with the day-to-day operations of the
business may understandably be weary of being forced to make potentially
uninformed decisions.
5. Inside Tiebreaker. To avoid the prospect of the partiality or
unfamiliarity of the outside tiebreaker, an inside tie-breaking clause calls for
the party-nominated director (or other designated representatives) to take
turns casting the deciding vote in qualifying impasses. Some believe,
3. Similar to a baseball arbitration. See, Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of FinalOffer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to
European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 110-111
(2009).
4. Id.
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however, that this type of provision unwisely leaves to chance an important
decision in which owners expect to have equal say. Worse yet, some critics
of this approach say it encourages gamesmanship where each party attempts
to stall a crucial decision until it has the deciding rotational vote.5
6. Chance. Of course, there is always the que será approach, which
unapologetically leaves the entire matter to chance by, say, a coin toss.
Although this option may seem precipitous, some parties consider it the
fairest of all. This bold mechanism can be incorporated into deadlock
provisions in a variety of ways, but it ultimately resolves deadlock matters
through luck (or lack thereof, as the case may be).6
7. Texas Shootout (see Section V below).
IV. Non-Contractual DBM Approaches
Other common deadlock alternatives exist—although none of them
especially pleasant—in the absence of a DBM. Like intestate death, some of
these alternatives result from failure to plan and force a strictly legal
resolution.
1. Custodian or Receivership. A custodian or receiver may be appointed
when the “members’ division is so severe that it prevents the orderly
operation of the business and threatens the entity with irreparable injury.”7 In
such case, an appointed custodian or receiver runs the enterprise. The
disadvantages here are obvious. “[C]ustomers, creditors and suppliers still
may be put off. They may refuse to deal with the corporation on the same
terms as before and may insist on protecting themselves to a greater degree.”8
2. Involuntary or Judicial Dissolution. A court might mandate a private
auction for the business in which each party provides the other a sealed bid;
the high bidder becomes the buyer while the low bidder becomes the seller
(at the higher price).9
3. Injunction. One of the parties to a JV impasse might seek injunctive
relief from a court. If granted, the court might compel or prohibit certain
5. Kenneth J. Vanko, Dissolution and Rational Choice: The Unique Remedial
Framework for Director Deadlock Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 38 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 348, 376 (2018).
6. Id.
7. Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking Mechanisms in LLCs—Flipping a Coin
is Not Good Enough, but Is Better Than Dissolution, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017.
8. Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You? Remedies for Oppressed Shareholders in
New Jersey, 204-AUG. N.J. LAW. 37, at 37, 39.
9. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial
Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 213 (2014).
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conduct in order to overcome the impasse. While potentially beneficial,
injunctive resolutions present inherent downsides. “Although an injunction
theoretically allows for the continuance of the company’s business, it does
not resolve deadlock, it holds a bad relationship together, and it is difficult to
obtain due to a high standard of proof.”10
V. The Texas Shootout
We have chosen to focus upon the Texas Shoot-out because we (i) practice
law in its namesake State and (ii) believe this DBM may often be the lesser
of necessary evils when implemented judiciously and in appropriate
circumstances.
In its classic form, the TSO, when triggered by either JV party, requires
each JV party to offer to buy the other’s entire interest in the JV at the price
indicated in a sealed bid. Typically, JV parties submit their bids to a third
party designated for such purpose in the JVA (“Referee”) who opens and
communicates the bids to the JV parties as provided in the JVA. The higher
bidder is then obligated to purchase the lower bidder’s JV interest at the strike
price.11
The TSO is a fairly popular DBM for a variety of reasons. First, the TSO
is simple in concept and implementation. Second, it allows for a rapid
resolution of the deadlock, thus allowing the JV to continue operating
normally once triggered and executed. Finally, it allows each JV party to
determine, through earnest soul searching, the intrinsic value of its JV interest
in light of all relevant circumstances.
The TSO, like all “shotgun” scenarios (including weddings), has its
drawbacks. First, it may lead to a precipitous divorce to the exclusion of a
negotiated resolution that might allow the JV to survive. Second, under some
circumstances, the TSO may favor the financially stronger or more informed
party to the detriment of the other. Finally, if not properly drafted, the TSO
may lead to acrimonious procedural spats and ultimately litigation, to the
detriment of both parties and the JV itself.
Upfront JVA negotiations, complemented by meticulous and balanced
drafting, can maximize advantages and curtail drawbacks of the TSO. Key
elements of this effort include: (i) identifying a qualifying voting impasse,
(ii) clear and realistic notification periods, (iii) sufficient time and
appropriate conditions to overcome the impasse, (iv) identification of a
viable Referee, and (v) unequivocal TSO procedures.
10. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking Mechanisms in LLCs at 1, 5.
11. See the footnote 7 in Annex 1 for another possible variant.
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VI. Our Texas “Shout-Out”
As indicated, the TSO suffers from the very characteristics that its name
implies—a precipitous rush to a precarious showdown fraught with
potentially needless dangers to the duelers and by-standers (creditors,
customers, employees) alike. As DBM drafters, we prefer a Texas Shout-out
to a Texas Shoot-out, in appropriate circumstances.
A well-drafted Texas Shout-out clause allows the potential combatants
adequate time and suitable procedures to amicably overcome an impasse
prior to a potentially deadly showdown. And ideally, it requires a further final
cooling-off period before either may shoot. In the end, however, the clause
must allow either party to call the other’s bluff, letting the chips fall where
they may, so that the JV may get on with business.
Our suggested Texas Shout-out clause appears in Annex 1. It is intended
as a model only and must be carefully modified to fit each set of
circumstances.
VII. Conclusion
As with any commercial contract, the effective JVA drafter will consider
both fairytale and nightmare decision-making scenarios. In particular, she
must contemplate, and expertly provide for, an eventual partner stand-off
threatening the very viability and continued existence of the venture. Section
III outlined a variety of available contractual DBMs to consider. For the
reasons stated, we believe that in many instances a properly drafted Texas
Shout-out clause provides the best option, absent a crystal ball. Hopefully the
above analysis, together with the suggested model clause and checklist, will
facilitate that task.
In any event, a wise JV dueler may do well to heed the admonition
popularized by Kenny Rogers:
You’ve got to know when to hold ‘em
Know when to fold ‘em
Know when to walk away
And know when to run.12
and thus, avoid a shootout not worth fighting.

12. KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists Group 1978).
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ANNEX 1
MODEL TEXAS SHOUTOUT CLAUSE13
Deadlock
(a)

If a vote of the General Assembly14 fails to agree on a Resolution
proposed pursuant to Article [ ] whose adoption one Shareholder
("Proponent") feels is essential for the proper administration or
substantial achievement of the Company’s purposes as stated in the
By-Laws15 (“Assertion”), the Proponent may initiate the following
procedure to resolve the impasse ("Impasse").

(b)

The Proponent may Notify the other Party of the Assertion within 15
days of such vote, failing which the Proponent's right to raise the
Assertion under this Article expires.

(c)

The Shareholders have 15 days from the date of Notification under
(b) to resolve the Impasse, failing which the Proponent may request
that the Expert16 provide, within 30 days, a written opinion
confirming or denying the Assertion.17

(d)

If the Expert confirms the Assertion, the Company bears the Expert´s
related costs. If the Expert denies the Assertion, the Proponent bears
the Expert´s costs.

(e)

If the Expert confirms the Assertion, each Shareholder must use
reasonable best efforts during the next 60 days18 to resolve the
Impasse.

(f) Failing (e), either Shareholder may refer the Impasse to a Mediator19
with target completion of 60 days.20

13. The capitalized terms would be defined in the JVA.
14. The JVA could provide a different triggering event.
15. Reference to By-Laws here is optional.
16. The JVA would indicate the Expert, who could possibly be the Company´s auditor.
17. This presumes that an Expert has been lined up ahead of time for JVA consultations
and that the rules of such engagement have been agreed.
18. This model calls for relatively long periods in hopes of allowing an amicable solution.
The drafter might consider shorter periods, depending on the client’s preference.
19. This presumes that the JVA dispute resolution clause contains non-binding mediation
provisions.
20. Some clients may not wish to provide for mediation.
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(g)

Following (f) each Shareholder must use reasonable best efforts
during the next 30 days to resolve the Impasse.

(h)

Should (g) fail, each Shareholder must appoint a representative fully
authorized to resolve the Impasse (“Representative”). At the request
of either Shareholder, the Representatives must meet at the Expert's
office (or other agreed location) at 9:00 a.m. on a day, within 15 days
of such request, agreed by the Shareholders or failing which, chosen
by the Expert ("Meeting").

(i)

Should the Meeting fail to resolve the Impasse by 5:00 p.m., each
Representative must, by 5:00 p.m. the following Business Day,21
submit a sealed envelope to the Expert containing a firm offer, stated
in US Dollars cash, to purchase the other Shareholder’s
Shareholding.

(j)

The Expert must immediately show the offers to the Representatives
and provide them authenticated copies.

(k)

The Shareholder who makes the higher offer must purchase the
offered Shareholding at the price it offered.22

(l)

Each Shareholder must use reasonable best efforts to promptly close
such purchase.

21. The JVA parties may wish to allow a longer period here.
22. Alternatively, the lower bidder may be given the choice to (i) purchase the high
bidder’s interest at the higher price or (ii) sell its interest to the higher bidder at the higher
offered price.
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ANNEX 2
DESCRIPTION OF DEADLOCK BREAKING MECHANISMS
TYPE
Appraisal

Russian
Roulette

Texas
Shootout

OVERVIEW
A qualified expert
provides an
independent
appraisal of the
value of the
interest to be
purchased or sold

One party sets the
terms and price of
a 50% interest,
and the other party
decides whether
they want to sell
or buy on those
terms (essentially,
“I cut, you
choose”)

Each party to a
joint venture

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/2

MECHANICS, EXAMPLES, & NOTES
Used in conjunction with a buy-out provision, an appraisal mechanism determines
valuation through:
 An agreed single appraiser
 An average of two appraisals (one appraiser chosen by each party)
 An average of the two closest appraisals out of a set number
 A premium on or discount from the appraised value, based on the reason for
the dissolution (or some other factor)
 An appraiser’s choice between each party’s valuation
Example:
Upon deadlock, each party selects an appraiser. If the resulting appraisals are
comparable, then an average of the two appraisals will be the valuation. If not, the
two selected appraisers choose an additional appraiser to make the ultimate
appraisal.
One party determines the buy-out terms and the other party decides if they want to
buy or sell on those terms.

SOURCES
Carsten Beith et al., Challenging
Transactions: Confronting Difficult
Regulatory, Tax, Antitrust, and Business
Issues in Hospital to Hospital Transactions
and Hospital-Physician Arrangements,
20160627 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 31
(2016).
John W. Welch, Practical Guide to Forming
A Partnership in Utah, 12 BYU J. PUB. L.
111, 135 (1997).

Business Transactions Solutions § 65:62
Carsten Beith et al., Challenging
Transactions.

Example:
Party A notifies Party B, that she is willing to either purchase B’s interest at a
specified price or sell her own interest at the same price. Upon notification, B then
has a set period of time to elect either to purchase A’s interest at the set price or
sell his interest to A at the set price.
Note:
These clauses are rarely invoked because they involve guaranteed dissolution of
the joint venture but can be useful in situations where the members (or at least the
triggering member) no longer wishes to remain in a business relationship with the
other party.
Both parties submit sealed bids to a third party. The party with the highest bid
must buy out the other party at that price.

Carsten Beith et al., Challenging
Transactions.

makes an offer
through sealed
bidding to buy out
the other party

Dutch Auction

Tie Breaker

Flip a Coin

This is a variation
of the Texas
Shootout

The parties refer
the issue to a
designated tie
breaker

Decisions are
determined by a
coin flip

Example:
If Party A submits a bid of $100 and Party B submits a bid of $125, then B must
purchase A’s interest for $125.
Note:
Information asymmetries can be mitigated but only if the parties “anticipate at the
time of drafting their business agreement which of the two owners will have better
information.”
Both parties submit sealed bids stating their minimum price to a third party. The
highest bidder must purchase the other party’s interest at the lower price.
Example:
If Party A submits her (minimum) bid of $100 and Party B submits his (minimum)
bid of $125, then B must purchase A’s interest for $100.
When invoked, this kind of provision calls upon a specified third party to break the
deadlock.
Note:
 Advantages:
o Tie-breaker clauses are easy to draft.
o The appointment of a designated tie breaker “does not carry the stigma
that a receiver or custodian does; therefore, such an appointment does
not have the impact on creditor and customer relations that other kinds
of appointments do.”
o A tie breaker can potentially remain available to help resolve future
disputes.
 Disadvantages:
o “[F]ew likely are willing to undertake this endeavor.”
o “[A]n outsider who is not familiar with the day-to-day business of the
corporation may fear liability from making a key business judgment or
may not understand enough to make that judgment in the first place.”
This kind of mechanism can be incorporated into deadlock provisions in a variety
of ways.
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Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier,
Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 YALE J. ON
REG. 143, 163 (2014).
Peter B. Ladig, Death by Auction: Can We
Do Better?, 73 BUS. LAW. 53, 80 (2018).

Carsten Beith et al., Challenging
Transactions.

Kenneth J. Vanko, Dissolution and Rational
Choice: The Unique Remedial Framework
for Director Deadlock Under the Illinois
Business Corporation Act, 38 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 348, 376 (2018).
Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You?
Remedies for Oppressed Shareholders in
New Jersey, 204-AUG N.J. LAW. 37, 39
(2000).

Stevens A. Carey, Real Estate Venture Exit
Strategy Provisions, 33 PRAC. REAL EST.
LAW. 41, 49 (2017).

Example (buy-out context):
If the selling member of the buy-out is “concerned that a bulk transaction could
result in a discount because, among other matters, the venture’s properties may be
at different stages of development and the properties may be ready for sale (or may
experience a peak or depression in value) at different times,” the parties can
alleviate this concern through a process whereby the parties “value each of the
properties, then flip a coin and take turns selecting properties until one member
gets within a certain range of its share of the values (and a final adjustment is then
made in cash).”

Rotating Vote

Partition or
Sale of
Company or
Assets

The parties
alternate the role
of tie-breaking
vote whenever
there is a deadlock
on a decision

This alternative
works only in
limited
circumstances,
such as where the
assets or activities
are easily
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Example (arbitration context):
An agreement that provides for arbitration may require the selected arbitrator to
come from a pool provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). If the
parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, then the AAA “will provide a list of three
available retired judges, and each [party] may strike one of the available retired
judges. The remaining retired judge shall resolve the issue.” However, if the
parties both strike the same potential arbitrator, then they “shall flip a coin to
determine which of the retired judges shall make the determination.”
The parties take alternating turns casting the decisive vote.
Note:
 This kind of mechanism, however, is “inconsistent with the purpose of an
equally-divided firm. Owners expect to have an equal say in management,
which corresponds to an unfettered veto right, regardless of whether that right
ultimately proves to be judicious.”
 This kind of provision encourages parties to “game the system and feign
deadlock over secondary issues in the hopes of gaining a deciding vote on
more critical ones.”
 “Where the assets of a corporation consist primarily of separate parcels of
land or buildings, partition may afford more effective relief than a buy-out.
Each shareholder can then have his or her expectations of real estate
ownership — albeit on a smaller scale — met.”
 “Partition might also be preferable in cases where customer lists (perhaps in
different geographic areas) could be split, or in a case where one business
could be readily divided in half. In many cases, where the second or third

Drafting Partnership Agreements and
Operating Agreements: Selected Issues,
SK011 ALI-ABA 179 , 290

Kenneth J. Vanko, Dissolution and Rational
Choice.

Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You?

Involuntary or
Judicial
Dissolution
Custodianship
or
Receivership

Injunction

Specific
Performance
Judicial
Expulsion

separated without
destroying the
business itself or
where the value of
the assets is easily
identified or
agreed upon
Court intervention

A custodian may
be appointed when
the “members’
division is so
severe that it
prevents the
orderly operation
of the business
and threatens the
entity with
irreparable injury”



generations in family-owned businesses cannot get along — but both sides
want to continue with some part of the family enterprise — partition may be
more appropriate than a buy-out. The parties’ expectations of continuing in
management — and in the family business — are then met.”
“[S]ome adjustment must be made to accommodate for the fact that one party
will retain the name of the business and the goodwill associated with it.”

Example:
A court might mandate a private auction in which the parties participate in a
sealed-bid auction and the party with the highest bid becomes the buyer and the
other party becomes the seller (at the higher price).
An appointed custodian runs the venture.

Note:
 Although the term custodian is less onerous than receiver, “customers,
creditors and suppliers still may be put off. They may refuse to deal with the
corporation on the same terms as before, and may insist on protecting
themselves to a greater degree.” These issues can be minimized if the
custodian works through the parties rather than supplants them entirely.
 “A custodian who is not a ‘fast study’ may actually exacerbate the situation if
he or she is not able to steer the corporate ship — which may already be
foundering — effectively. The [parties] may find [themselves] rearranging
deck chairs on a ship that is still going down — only under the stewardship of
a different captain.”
A court requires or “Although an injunction theoretically allows for the continuance of the company’s
prohibits the
business, it does not resolve deadlock, it holds a bad relationship together, and it is
performance of
difficult to obtain due to a high standard of proof.”
certain conduct
Equitable remedy This alternative “features the unfortunate characteristic of forcibly keeping a
requiring a party
contentious relationship together without providing a method to resolve future
to perform a
deadlock.”
specific act
Removal of a
Expulsion can be effectuated “by judicial order in a case in which a member’s
member from the
wrongful conduct adversely and materially affects the company’s activities and
enterprise
affairs, constitutes a willful or persistent and material breach of the operating
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Landeo & KaSpier, Irreconcilable
Differences.

Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You?
Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking
Mechanisms in LLCs—Flipping a Coin is
Not Good Enough, but Is Better Than
Dissolution, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017.

Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking
Mechanisms in LLCs, at 1, 5.

Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking
Mechanisms in LLCs, at 1, 5

Louis T. M. Conti & Gregory M. Marks,
Florida’s New Revised LLC Act, Part III, 88
FLA. B.J. 34 (2014).

Mediation

Arbitration

A neutral party
presides over
voluntary
negotiations
A process “to
obtain a resolution
in an adversary
manner more
quickly than might
occur in state or
federal court”

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/2

agreement, violates fiduciary duties or other statutory standards of conduct … or
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs
with that person as a member.”
“Mediation is useful in situations where the parties are motivated to compromise,
but it may be fruitless when the parties are so hostile and entrenched that
compromise is impossible.”
Example:
“Any controversy or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration. Such arbitration shall be effected by
arbitrators selected as hereinafter provided. The dispute shall be submitted to three
arbitrators each of whom shall have had at least ten (10) years’ experience in the
restaurant business, one arbitrator being selected by each Manager … the two
designated arbitrators shall pick the third. The decision of a majority of the
arbitrators shall be binding on all parties.”

Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking
Mechanisms in LLCs.

Operating agreement for two manager, four
member Limited Liability Company LLC
with voting and nonvoting members and
anti-deadlock provisions as to managers’
actions, 15 MASS. PRAC., LEGAL FORMS §
13:8 (5th ed. 2019)
Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking
Mechanisms in LLCs, at 5.

ANNEX 3
COMPARISON OF DEADLOCK BREAKING MECHANISMS

GENERAL LIKELY RESULTS

PROVISIONS
Slice-of-the-pie Provisions

Leaves
dysfunctional
relationship intact

Appraisal
Russian Roulette
Texas Shootout
Dutch Auction
Other Provisions
Tie Breaker
Flip a Coin

Custodianship or Receivership
Injunction
Specific Performance
Judicial Expulsion
Mediation
Arbitration
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Information
asymmetry leads to
inefficient outcomes

Requires specific,
limited circumstances
to be efficient
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Partition/Sale of Company/Assets
Common Alternatives When Deadlock Mechanisms Fail or Are Absent
Involuntary or Judicial Dissolution

Outside force
determines value
or outcome
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Rotating Vote

Leads to ultimate
dissolution of
venture
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